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In all its activities in support of client or Canadian interests, the Canadian Coast Guard Fleet’s goal is to provide services in a safe, secure, effective, and efficient manner.

While Section 4 examined services by client, Section 5 looks at the Fleet’s accountability and overall performance, with measures endorsed by the Fleet Executive Board. This board is the Fleet’s management and governance board, consisting of the Headquarters’ Fleet Directors and the Regional Directors, Fleet, and is led by the Director General, Fleet.

As new evaluation criteria and factors are required, performance measures will evolve to ensure that the Fleet has the most meaningful, timely, and accurate information on which to base decisions and report to Canadians.

CCGS Cap Tourmente, SAR Lifeboat, During an Exercise
CCGS Cap Tourmente, SAR Lifeboat, During an Exercise


The Canadian Coast Guard Fleet is managed through a clear national accountability structure based on the principles of openness, transparency, and national consistency. The Fleet Executive Board, chaired by the Fleet’s Director General, is accountable for promoting national consistency and leadership in the management of the Fleet and its personnel in such matters as safety, security, planning, financial management, human resources, performance, and vessels and helicopter operations. The Fleet Executive Board convenes regularly to make decisions and recommendations regarding operations, policy setting and planning, and to resolve national issues.

Wheelhouse on CCGS Griffon - C&A
Wheelhouse on CCGS Griffon - C&A

The Fleet’s Regional Directors report to their respective regional Assistant Commissioners, who in turn report to the Commissioner. Fleet Regional Directors, through their Assistant Commissioners, are accountable for the Fleet’s day-to-day operations, program delivery and associated financial, safety, security, and operational management of the Fleet and its personnel on a regional basis.

Since sound decisions require accurate, timely, and comprehensive information, CCG Fleet will continue to invest in the improvement of its information management systems. These systems are critical for decision-making, planning, measuring performance, and reporting at all levels of management and to the public. The Fleet Activity Information System (FAIS) is in the process of being replaced with iFleet, a system that will enhance the capture of Fleet vessels’ activities on an hourly basis to provide quick and accurate information to all levels of management.

2009–2010 Results

Completed architecture design for iFleet upgrade project;

Published and maintained the evergreen Intranet-based Fleet Management E-Manual; and

Developed an Environmental Management Framework for internal operations to establish the principles and considerations necessary to begin addressing requirements for reducing emissions as well as other greening of government initiatives.

Accountability to Canadians and Program Clients

The Fleet is accountable for the ongoing provision of services primarily through the execution and delivery of the Fleet Operations Plan. Accountability for the Fleet’s overall management is governed by the Canadian Coast Guard’s three-year Business Plan, which includes accountability for delivery on the priorities of CCG with regards to enhancing services, supporting people and maximizing efficiency.

Table 10 outlines the priorities identified in the Business Plan as well as the activities conducted throughout the year in support of these priorities. This information is also reported in the 2009−2010 Business Plan Mid-Year Review and Year-End Report. These reports are available at: http://www.ccggcc.

Table 10: The Fleet's Commitments and Achievements, 2009-2010
What was Achieved
CCG Business Plan Priority:
Improving Client Service (Service Level Agreements with DFO Clients)
Implement Service Level Agreements with Science and Ecosystems and Fisheries Management as a three year pilot, and review and improve performance measures. Green

Service Level Agreements (SLA) were signed in April 2009 with DFO Ecosystems and Fisheries Management and Science. Funding transfers have taken place and first quarterly report to Science and Ecosystems and Fisheries Management clients was provided, as planned. Quarterly meetings were held at the DG level with both sectors as per SLA. Ongoing improvements have been incorporated and reporting quality has improved. A comprehensive year-end quantitative and qualitative report was developed.

CCG Business Plan Priority:
Effective Management of Our Workforce and Workplace (Recruitment and Diversity)
Ensure the Operational Women’s Network is fully engaged. Green The Operational Women’s Network is officially included as a sub-committee of the Fleet Executive Board. Website with communications protocols for members is being developed.
CCG Business Plan Priority:
Key Initiatives - Ongoing Services (Ongoing Improvements in Fleet Management)
Complete architecture design for Fleet Activity Information System (iFleet) upgrade project. Green The Project is on budget and on schedule.
Revise the Fleet Renewal Plan. Green

CCG has consulted extensively within DFO and with other government departments and Central Agencies in revising and updating its Fleet Renewal Plan. CCG will continue to develop the Plan in line with Government direction.

Federal Budget 2010 provided $27.3M for the replacement of an Air Cushioned Vessel (ACV) for the Pacific Region.

Publish and maintain an intranet-based Fleet Management E-Manual. Green The E-manual is published and on-line. It will be maintained on a regular basis as an evergreen document.
Finalize standardized crewing matrix predicated on competency (crewing) profiles. Green All Ship Profiles have been finalized and posted on CCG vessels. Work is progressing on the crewing profiles during maintenance/refit periods.
CCG Business Plan Priority:
Key Initiatives - Ongoing Services (Fleet Human Resources Initiatives)
Initiate research on vision standards for seagoing personnel. Yellow Marine Personnel Branch is working with Transport Canada to incorporate CCG requirements into the new TC-led national standard for Canadian seafarers. An action plan to address Bona Fide Occupational Requirements for vision for seagoing positions that are linked to national and international regulatory requirements will be implemented in FY2010-2011.
Develop a Ships’ Crew Certification Program. Green Completed the development of requirements in the Engine Room and Navigation streams for Ships’ Crew to become Ships’ Officers. The development of detailed syllabi for each of the specific certificates modules and the implementation of the Ships’ Crew Certification Program will be initiated in FY2010-2011.

GreenThe project or deliverables were completed as planned and/or decision/approval was obtained by April 30, 2010

YellowThe project or deliverables were not completed as planned due to external factors, or substantial progress has been made but the project or deliverables were no fully completed by April 30, 2010.

RedThe project or deliverables are substantially incomplete.

All ongoing Fleet commitments for fiscal year 2008–2009 are covered in the CCG 2008–2011 Business Plan at


The Fleet operates in a high-risk environment. Our vessels, air cushion vehicles, and helicopters conduct operations in some of the world’s most remote locations under extreme environmental conditions. Despite these challenges, the Fleet remains committed to safety, security, and environmental protection in the delivery of quality services to its clients. The safety and security of seagoing personnel, supernumeraries, support staff, scientists, and contractors is paramount.

As an organization, the Fleet manages risk through the Safety and Security Management System (SSMS). A total of 25 full-time employees work with seagoing and shorebased Fleet personnel to promote a culture that puts safety and security first on a daily basis. This “culture of safety” includes a comprehensive system of audits conducted onboard all Fleet vessels to monitor the results of incidents, and mitigation policies and systems procedures to protect employees. Fleet employees conduct audits to ensure continuity and monitor the effectiveness of the overall program, and this has improved the sharing of SSMS best practices. We are currently working on implementation of the CCG Fleet auditors’ competency improvements, qualifications standards, and training program, to be completed in 2010-11. In addition to supporting succession planning, this initiative will ensure standardized audits using best practices across Canada.

SAR Exercise
SAR Exercise

The Canadian Coast Guard and the Fleet are committed to providing and maintaining a work environment that complies with and exceeds regulatory health and safety requirements. The Fleet strives to protect employees from hazards which could result in injury, illness, or loss or damage to property. As a result of this commitment, once a real or potential safety deficiency has been identified or new regulations or standards come into force, Fleet Safety and Security develops or updates policies and procedures to reflect best practices. This ensures the Canadian Coast Guard Fleet remains a safe and dynamic learning organization.

Coast Guard SAR Team
Coast Guard SAR Team

An example of the Fleet’s adoption of a best practice based on a recently published industry standard is the ongoing implementation of the Respiratory Protection Program (RPP). At times, Fleet personnel may come into contact with airborne hazardous particles such as when removing old paint or, in extreme situations, when fighting a fire onboard their vessels. To ensure employee safety, the RPP requires that all seagoing employees wear respiratory protective devices when undertaking certain tasks, and not just during firefighting and emergencies. The Respiratory Protection Program will ensure that all seagoing employees know how to care for and use respiratory equipment and have been properly fit-tested to wear the required device. The Respiratory Protection Program is expected to be fully implemented by October 2010.

Coast Guard Ship at Sea
Coast Guard Ship at Sea

CCG Fleet is also putting measures in place to ensure more effective small craft operations and training oversight. Small Vessel Operator Proficiency Training and Rigid Hull Inflatable Operators’ Training was issued in 2008 and re-issued in 2010. A Curriculum Advisory Group including CCG Auxiliary participation ensures training is kept current. The Fleet continues to investigate a proposal for standardization of CCG small craft training delivery for Eastern Canada.

To reduce risks to Auxiliarists during operations with and for the Canadian Coast Guard, agreements are in place with Fleet experts to attend the regional and national meetings of the Auxiliary. The Auxiliary now participate on the Operational Support’s Curriculum Advisory Group on small craft training.

CCG Fleet fosters a culture of safety in the workplace that extends well beyond simply complying with regulations. Employees take part in safety training and awareness sessions, contribute to external and internal audits and provide valuable insight regarding the continuous development and improvement of safety policies, guidelines, and procedures. Creating, maintaining and promoting a safe and secure workplace aboard all our vessels assures clients and Canadians of the Fleet’s overall operational readiness.

In 2009–2010, 132 audits were completed and 34 new ship security officers were certified under the SSMS. Fleet Safety and Security also tracked each reported shipboard incident. As Graph 13 illustrates, there was a 2% increase in the number of reported incidents in 2009- 10. Reported incidents include disabling injuries, hazardous occurrences and unsatisfactory conditions.

Graph 13: Trend of Reported Incidents, 2005-2006 to 2009-2010

While no major incidents were reported in 2009-2010, the number of reported unsatisfactory conditions (a situation that is not a safety incident but could potentially evolve into one) increased by 34% from 2008-2009. This increase is attributed to greater awareness of reporting requirements and the establishment of a more rigorous vessel maintenance management program as well as the inclusion of the small vessel fleet into the SSMS. The number of hazardous occurrences, however, has decreased by 20% in 2009-2010, which can be attributed to employees’ increasingly proactive attitude when dealing with safety issues.

Mission Readiness Framework

Centralized coordination is crucial to the Fleet’s quick response during unforeseen events, helping ensure the safety of our personnel and of others who may be at risk. Prompt and accurate information, clear guidelines and established operating procedures are essential decision-making support tools that often affect the outcome of difficult or unusual situations.

Developed in the wake of our Hurricane Katrina relief efforts in 2004−2005, the Fleet’s Mission Readiness Framework allows us to respond in a more systematic way to unpredictable events or unplanned requests for urgent support. The framework provides strategies and protocols to deal with changes in normal operating circumstances, whether they are environmental (e.g. storms, ice conditions, floods), hardware-related (e.g. technical breakdowns, accidents) or human (e.g. security threats, public health emergencies, illnesses) in nature.

As part of the Mission Readiness Framework, daily briefings to senior management at CCG Headquarters and readiness response profiles help the Fleet plan for a faster, bettercoordinated response. These activities and others help ensure that mission readiness and the culture of safety are codified and remain part of the Fleet’s core principles.

H1N1 Pandemic

During the summer of 2009, increased attention was given to the approaching flu season and the H1N1 influenza virus. Early reports indicated the possibility of a larger infection rate among Canadians. In preparation, the Fleet reviewed all available information on influenza and on the H1N1 virus and began incorporating the latest medical guidelines and illness prevention practices into its preparedness efforts. Through an arranged specific services contract, the Fleet ensured that Commanding Officers could consult with on-duty physicians should they need medical advice while at sea. Medical practitioners reviewed and amended the Fleet’s pharmaceutical list and personal protective equipment stocks were supplemented. The Fleet also prepared an infectious diseases framework to cover a variety of scenarios that could play out aboard its vessels. Similarly, shore-based personnel received guidance from the Department of Fisheries and Oceans’ Safety, Security and Real Property Directorate.

Whether dealing with the flu or a gastro-intestinal illness aboard our ships, the general steps Fleet personnel must take to prevent, contain, treat, and recover from infectious diseases in confined quarters are similar. These practices are now being incorporated into normal shipboard operations. Loss of Fleet readiness to H1N1 was negligible thanks in part to combined efforts aiming to reduce the spread of the virus.

CCG Fast Rescue Craft and a US Coast Guard Dauphin Helicopter during a SAR Exercise
CCG Fast Rescue Craft and a US Coast Guard Dauphin Helicopter during a SAR Exercise

Improvements to CCG

Following the capsizing of the fishing vessel L’Acadien II while under tow by a Canadian Coast Guard icebreaker in March 2008, CCG formed a dedicated team to support the independent investigation into this incident and analyze the recommendations offered in all reports on this incident. In 2009-2010, CCG implemented several recommendations contained in the action plan developed in response to reports on this tragic incident. These include:

Towing Procedures

  • A literature review on towing operations, ice operations, and specifically towing in ice, conducted by Dalhousie University’s Marine Activity and Risk Investigation Network;
  • A draft integrated CCG Assistance to Disabled Vessels Policy, produced and posted on the Internet in March 2010 for public consultation;
  • A Memorial University study and tank tests on towing dynamics in ice; and
  • Technical research.

Small Craft Training

  • The development of enhanced documentation practices, for example:
    • Small craft training will be enhanced by better safety audits, better planning, and better recordkeeping that is now included in the Safety Management System audit plan;
    • In December 2009, an initial internal audit of the Bamfield small craft training centre of expertise was conducted by CCG Fleet Safety and Security, with good results. An external audit of this facility is scheduled for November 2010;
    • Contingency planning guidance was issued as an Operational Risk procedure under the Fleet Safety and Security Manual; and
    • A Fleet Circular (08-2009) on Audio and Visual Recording of Training, Exercises and Operations was issued in September 2009.

Coast Guard Air Cushion Vehicle Entering the Water
Coast Guard Air Cushion Vehicle Entering the Water

2009–2010 Results

Developed material related to Fleet Safety and Security System for new employees;

Prior to the H1N1 pandemic, published a readiness plan including procedures for the prevention and response to pandemics onboard vessels so as to mitigate potential impact on Fleet readiness;

Continued implementation of the National Respiratory Protection Program, based on the Canadian Standards Association standard to reduce exposure to contaminants through improved ventilation, enclosure or isolation, or by substituting a less-hazardous process or material, and providing personal protective respiratory gear when needed;

Included the Hearing in Noise Test (HINT) and the Source Azimuth in Noise Test (SAINT) in periodic medical evaluations administered to all CCG seagoing employees. These tests provide an objective and accurate assessment of individuals’ capability to hear in noisy environments associated with vessel operations;

Implemented several recommendations contained in the action plan developed in response to reports of the L’Acadien II incident;

Integrated the Canadian Coast Guard College under the governance of the SSMS, with a view to full integration of the SSMS into the Canadian Coast Guard course curriculum and small craft training facilities;

Initiated a pilot project for the prevention of injuries through data analysis and ergonomic assessment in Newfoundland and Labrador Region to analyze the root causes of incidents and to develop an injury-prevention program;

Initiated discussions with unions and senior management to implement a safety, security and environmental compliance management system within the Canadian Coast Guard;

Reviewed CCG emergency communications protocols related to emergency situations to provide recommendations for improvements; and

Documented SSMS requirements to further enhance the system for newly built vessels.


Effectiveness is a concept used to assess the extent to which an organization is meeting its expected results. Fleet has developed various measures to assess its effectiveness, including service planned versus service delivered, as well as operational delays.

By comparing the service delivered to what had been planned for 2009−2010, the Fleet can gauge the effectiveness of its service delivery. Where values exceed 100%, service demands were actually higher than anticipated. Consequently, more operational days were delivered. Where values are below 100%, fewer operational days were delivered than had been planned. The normal tolerance range is plus or minus 10%, given operational, environmental and program fluidity.

As Graph 14 illustrates, an average of 103% of service planned was delivered across all Fleet clients in 2009-2010. While this represents an increase of 6% since 2006-2007, there have been major variances in certain individual program delivery rates since that time. Services delivered to the SAR, Icebreaking, Maritime Security, and EFM programs are all within the tolerance range. Following closely within the acceptable ranges are Aids to Navigation and Science. Environmental Response services delivered only 55% of its planned services while service delivered to OGDs and MCTS reached an all-time high of 150% and 192% respectively. Additional details on the service delivery of each individual program are included in Section 4.

Graph 14: Service Delivered versus Service Planned by Fleet Clients, 2009-2010 (%)

Another means of assessing fleet effectiveness is through operational delays. This measures the amount of time a vessel is available but experiencing delays due to factors such as weather, waiting for equipment or personnel, equipment breakdown or for administrative reasons.

Graph 15 shows that in 2009-2010, a total of 821 operational days were lost due to delays. Of these days, 66% (546) were lost due to weather, ice and tidal conditions. This is consistent with the five year trend showing weather-related conditions to be the main cause of operational delays. As has also been the trend over the past five years, the three programs most often affected by delays are EFM (42% average), Science (25% average), and Aids to Navigation (19% average).

Graph 15: Service Time Lost Due to Delays, 2005-2006 to 2009-2010 (% of Total Operational Days)

Launching a Fast Rescue Craft
Launching a Fast Rescue Craft

Coast Guard SAR Fast Rescue Craft
Coast Guard SAR Fast Rescue Craft


If effectiveness is the extent to which the Fleet is meeting expected results, efficiency is about how well it uses its time and resources in order to do so. The Fleet uses vessel availability and multitasking as performance measures to determine how efficiently it delivers services to clients.

At any given time, a vessel is either available or unavailable for operations. When a vessel is available, it can be assigned to a client (e.g. SAR, EFM, icebreaking, Aids to Navigation, amongst others), multi-tasked, engaged in administrative or other tasks such as community and visitor relation activities, or simply unassigned. When conditions dictate that a vessel is unavailable due to winterization, layup due to lack of funds or its extended refit or maintenance, for example it cannot be tasked to client operations.

As Graph 16 indicates, the Fleet spent 67% of the total time in 2009-2010 (all operational states) assigned to clients. In other words, Fleet used 97% of its planned operational time to provide client services. This is a slight increase of 2% since last year. The majority of the remaining time was spent in layup/ winterization (18%) or maintenance (12%), followed by direction and administration (2%), and other activities (1%).

Graph 16: Utilization of Vessels by Operational State, 2009-2010

In 2009-2010, vessels spent a total of 5681 days in both planned and unplanned maintenance. While this overall total is relatively the same as the previous year, the number of planned and unplanned days have changed. 2009-2010 noted a decrease of 60 days in planned maintenance and an increase of 52 days of unplanned maintenance/breakdowns. Unfortunately, unplanned breakdowns are impossible to avoid, causing an average 3% of lost operational time.

As illustrated in Graph 17, the increased amount of time vessels are unavailable due to maintenance or refit can be explained by the fact that older vessels require more care and maintenance. As a result, more resources and planned maintenance time is dedicated to the Fleet’s most at-risk vessels in an effort to maintain and stabilize current availability levels.

Graph 17: Vessels Not Available Time Due to Maintenance/Refit, 2005-2006 to 2009-2010 (# of Operational Days)

The second relative measure of efficiency is multitasking. Simultaneous missions for a variety of clients can often be conducted by one vessel, within the constraints of geography, time, availability and capability. Icebreakers, for example, can provide a number of other services while conducting their primary operations. This could include environmental monitoring and/response, search and rescue coverage, or observe, report and record functions for maritime security.

In 2009-2010, the Fleet Operations Plan scheduled 5.9% of operational days to be spent in multitasking activities. This target was exceeded, however, as the Fleet actually ended up being multitasked 10.7% of the time. While the time spent multitasking was nearly double from what was planned, both the planned and delivered multitasked days (Table 12) indicate a downward trend over the past five years that is taking us further away from the ultimate goal of a 15% multitasked fleet. This trend could be attributed to the continuing demand for dedicated program missions onboard certain vessels (especially in the Arctic such as the UNCLOS and ArcticNet programs) that do not allow for multitasking, and to the increase in unplanned breakdowns. Unplanned breakdowns of certain vessels can reduce time spent in multitasking activities, since the vessels that assume the uncompleted work can only do so on a dedicated basis.

 % Planned% Delivered
Table 11: Multitasking Trend, 2005-2006 to 2009-2010 (%)
2005-2006 17.3% 13.9%
2006-2007 16.5% 13.8%
2007-2008 7.2% 12.3%
2008-2009 7.2% 11.7%
2009-2010 5.9% 10.7%

CCGS Westport, SAR Lifeboat and DND Cormorant Helicopter
CCGS Westport, SAR Lifeboat and DND Cormorant Helicopter


The Canadian Coast Guard Fleet makes every effort to minimize costs and maximize operational days to achieve its objectives. Regional Operations Centres (ROCs) and regional operational planning groups work with the Fleet’s clients to ensure that planned activities are accomplished, that the Fleet is operationally ready, and that any vessel able to do so is multi-tasked to the maximum extent possible.

To sustain an operationally ready fleet capable of meeting service demands, Fleet management continues to seek out internal efficiencies that will optimize national consistency, organizational effectiveness, and linkages with regions and clients. As part of the ongoing Service Level Agreement (SLA) pilot process, Fleet continues to examine how it conducts business and is making needed improvements to enhance service to clients focused on integrated planning and performance management. The Fleet will also renew both its Investment Plan and Fleet Renewal Plan to keep investment planning aligned with operational needs, given funding limitations. Table 12 provides an overview of Fleet’s national budget for 2009-2010.

Table 12: Fleet National Budget 2009-2010 ($000s)
Fleet 150,240 30,321 40,100 220,661 220,661
Helicopters - 10,705 - 10,705 10,705
Subtotal 150,240 41,026 40,100 231,366 231,366
Shore 20,484 5,488 - 25,972 25,972
Total 170,724 46,514 40,100 257,388 257,388

2009–2010 Results

Developed an Integrated Investment Plan under the new Treasury Board Secretariat Policy on Investment Planning – Assets and Acquired Services, to inform government decision-making on resource allocation and ensure decisions are affordable, productive, and financially sustainable while balancing risk and benefits; and

Achieved the Economic Action Plan spending target of $82 million dollars, which has resulted in the construction of 31 new CCG vessels and small craft, and initiated other projects which are on track for completion by March 31, 2011.

Fuel Prices

Of all the Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funds spent by the Fleet, fuel is the largest single purchase. Because of its volatility, the price of fuel is one of the national financial risks accepted by the Fleet on behalf of its clients. The Fleet carefully monitors fuel prices and consumption as well as currency fluctuation throughout the year to determine whether additional funds are required. This operation is particularly crucial given that a $0.01 increase in fuel prices per litre translates into a $700,000 increase in the Fleet’s year-end fuel bill based on a 70 million litre requirement. This is also made more complex when one considers the vast differences in fuel prices from one coast to another and the differences in prices between different grades of fuel. Arctic fuel prices are considerably higher than elsewhere, for example, so refueling icebreakers in the Arctic is an expensive proposition. Therefore, to minimize these costs, icebreakers go to the Arctic with full fuel tanks and “bulk” purchases for fuel are negotiated with competitive bids from suppliers, as part of the normal conditions governing the purchasing process.

Projections for 2009-2010 fuel prices were finalized in January 2009 for planning and budgeting purposes. At that time, prices had collapsed due to the global recession. Fuel prices in January were extremely low ($42.00 US per barrel) and were predicted to remain low for the remainder of 2009 and part of 2010. Between January 2009 and April 2009, however, West Texas Intermediate increased from $42 to $70 US per barrel and remained high for the duration of fiscal year 2009-2010. This resulted in a significant increase in funding requirements for the purchase of fuel, and higher than expected expenditures, as evidenced in Graph 18.

Due to these fluctuations beyond the control of CCG, the Fleet fuel budget was fixed at $40.1 million annually.

Graph 18: Average Quarterly Diesel Price per Litre, 2009-2010

CCG MBB BO-105 Helicopter
CCG MBB BO-105 Helicopter