ARCHIVED - MEASURING PERFORMANCE
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Whether supporting CCG, DFO, or OGDs, or protecting broader Canadian interests, The Fleet’s goal is to provide services in a safe, secure, effective, and efficient manner.
While Section 4 examined services by client, Section 5 looks at the Fleet’s accountability and overall performance, with measures endorsed by the Fleet Executive Board. This board is the Fleet’s management and governance board, consisting of the Headquarters’ Fleet Directors and the Regional Directors, Fleet, and is led by the Director General, Fleet.
As new evaluation criteria and factors are required, performance measures will evolve to ensure that the Fleet has meaningful, timely and accurate information on which to base decisions and report to Canadians.
Accountability to CCG Senior Management
The Fleet is managed through a clear national accountability structure based on the principles of openness, transparency and national consistency. The Fleet Executive Board, a national body led by the Director General, Fleet, is accountable for promoting national consistency and leadership in the management of the Fleet and its personnel in such matters as safety, security, planning, financial management, people management and development, performance and the operation of vessels and helicopters. The Fleet Executive Board meets regularly to make decisions and recommendations regarding consistent operations, policy setting and planning (strategic, business, capital, financial, and human resources), and to resolve national Fleet issues.
The Regional Directors, Fleet, reporting to their respective regional Assistant Commissioners, who in turn report to the Commissioner, are accountable for the dayto- day operations, program delivery and associated financial management, safety and security, and operational management of the Fleet and its personnel on a regional basis.
Accountability to Program Clients
The Fleet is accountable to its clients for the ongoing provision of services primarily through the execution and delivery of the Fleet Operations Plan. More generally, accountability for the Fleet’s overall management is governed by the Coast Guard’s comprehensive three-year Business Plan, which includes accountability for delivery on the priorities of CCG in its efforts to enhance its services, support its people and maximize its efficiency. The CCG Business Plan is available at www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/eng/ccg/home.
CCGS Griffon - High-Endurance Multi-Tasked Vessel/Light Icebreaker on flood control operations
Photo: C&A Region
Accountability to Canadians
Table 10 sets out the outcomes of the Fleet’s 2008–2009 commitments in the CCG 2007–2010 Business Plan. The table outlines the priorities identified in the Business Plan as well as the activities conducted throughout the year in support of these priorities. This information is also reported in the 2008–2009 Business Plan Mid-Year Review and Year-End Reports. These reports are available at: www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/eng/ccg/publications.
What was AchievedCommitment
|CCG Business Plan Priority: Support for Canada’s Maritime Security Agenda|
|Continue to provide expertise in the delivery of on-water support to security as part of the Government of Canada security agenda||
Four vessels on the Great Lakes–St. Lawrence Seaway System are providing the planned interim MSET on-water program delivery. Law enforcement familiarization training was provided during the winter.
The Fleet participated in the successful joint operation NANOOK 08 in the Arctic led by DND.
|CCG Business Plan Priority: Fleet Renewal|
|Implement mission readiness for the Fleet||
Mission readiness was implemented including the establishment of standard operating procedures and readiness response profiles to maximize successful Fleet operations in the event of unplanned events.
|Implement improved SLAs with internal non–Coast Guard clients based on new funding and charging models||
SLAs based on new funding and charging models have been put in place with DFO Science and FAM. These will be implemented on a “pilot” basis for the next three years and will include the development of a joint performance management framework.
|CCG Business Plan Priority: Continued Implementation of Modernization Initiatives|
|Assess internal options for increasing the number of marine engineers both on vessels and on shore||Six areas of shortcomings were established and a decision was taken to add 69 positions, in support of fleet maintenance activities. The emphasis was on the addition of marine engineering expertise. The new positions will be added over a three-year period.|
|CCG Business Plan Priority: Effective Management of Our Workforce and Workplace|
|Implement the pilot Seagoing Personnel Career Development Initiative||The project has been successfully implemented and integrated into routine operations.|
|Launch a network of women who represent SOs and SCs||The network has been established and will continue to evolve. Regional coordinators are in place and engaged.|
The project or deliverables were completed as planned and/or decision/approval was obtained by April 30, 2008.
The project or deliverables were not completed as planned due to external factors, or substantial progress has been made but the project or deliverables were not fully completed by April 30, 2008.
The project or deliverables are substantially incomplete.
All ongoing Fleet commitments for fiscal year 2008–2009 are covered in the CCG 2008–2011 Business Plan at www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/eng/ccg/home.
The Fleet operates in a significantly risk-based maritime environment where our vessels, ACVs, helicopters and small boats conduct operations in some of the world’s most remote locations under extreme environmental conditions. We remain committed to safety, security and environmental protection in the delivery of quality services to our clients. The safety and security of our seagoing personnel, supernumeraries, support staff and scientists is paramount.
The Fleet manages risk through the SSMS. A total of 25 full-time employees work with seagoing and shore-based Fleet personnel to promote a culture that puts safety and security first on a daily basis. These employees promote a culture of safety and ensure safe and secure delivery of services through a rigorous system of audits conducted on board all Fleet vessels.
In 2008–2009, 127 audits were completed and 37 new ship security officers were certified under the SSMS. Fleet Safety and Security also tracked each reported shipboard incident. Overall, the number of reported incidents continued to increase in 2008–2009. This increase can be attributed to an organizational culture change in which openly reporting incidents is considered an exercise in prevention and an opportunity to share best practices and lessons learned.
In 2007–2008, we reported net increases in unsatisfactory conditions and hazardous occurrences. This was attributed to increased awareness and the integration of the small fleet into the system. This year, the number of unsatisfactory conditions and hazardous occurrences has stabilized, with evidence pointing to a slight downward trend (see Graph 13). This trend can be attributed to employees’ being more proactive in dealing with safety issues.
Unfortunately, the number of disabling injuries has continued to rise in 2008–2009. A careful analysis of the statistical data has revealed that the marine workforce is aging (see Table 2 in Section 2.3) and that marine employees’ susceptibility to injury is therefore increasing. This increase in disabling injuries has also increased the total number of hazardous occurrences overall for 2008–2009.
CCG MBB-105 helicopter
Photo: Cpl David Cribb, DND Combat Camera
In the fall of 2008, an employee survey was developed and distributed to assess the effectiveness of Fleet’s SSMS. A preliminary analysis of the 1042 survey responses (31%) that were returned reveals that 77% of respondents believe they work within a “safety culture.” The full report is expected to be published in the fall of 2009.
Effectiveness is a concept used to assess the extent to which an organization is meeting its expected results. The Fleet has developed various measures to assess its effectiveness, including service planned versus service delivered, as well as operational delays.
By comparing the service delivered to what had been planned for 2008–2009, we gain an appreciation of the effectiveness of our service delivery (see Graph 14). Where values exceed 100%, service demands were actually higher than we had anticipated and consequently more operational days were delivered. Where values are below 100%, fewer operational days were delivered than had been planned. The normal tolerance range is plus or minus 10%, given operational, environmental, and program fluidity.
As Graph 14 shows, the Fleet achieved an overall service delivery average of 100% in 2008–2009, although some variability by program is apparent. As in previous years, despite significant planning of our vessel operations, adjustments had to be made throughout the year to accommodate the evolving needs of our clients. When extraneous requests for services are made during the year, the Fleet does its utmost to fulfill them. These figures are as much about clients providing accurate estimates of their need for services (planned days) at the beginning of the year and the fact that many maritime priorities cannot be forecasted, as they are about the actual execution of the Fleet Operations Plan during the year in question (delivered days).
Another means of assessing fleet effectiveness is measuring operational delays. This is based on the time a vessel is available but experiencing delays due to such factors as weather, the need to wait for equipment or personnel, equipment breakdown or for administrative reasons.
In 2008–2009, 834 days, or 2.7% of total vessel activities, were lost due to delays. As Graph 15 shows, this statistic has remained relatively stable over the past five years. Of all the services that the Fleet delivers, delays most often affect the FAM (34.1% of delays) and Science (23.5% of delays) programs; although the reasons for these delays are somewhat interpretative, some are driven by the physical condition of these vessels which are generally older then the rest of the fleet. However, the vast majority of delays were due to weather, difficult ice conditions, or the need to wait for a favourable tide.
The Fleet uses vessel availability and multitasking as performance measures to gauge its efficiency in delivering services to its clients. A vessel is available when it is ready to be assigned to a mission or client, and it is unavailable when in winterization, lay-up, or in extended planned or unplanned maintenance. Vessels in winterization are essentially unavailable for use by clients due to the seasonal nature of the program. This does not mean that the Fleet is restricting client access to the vessel but rather reflects the inherent nature of operations in a northern climate. Similarly, planned and unplanned maintenance is arranged in consultation with program client needs and also serves to instill confidence in the client that vessels are maintained to the best of CCG’s ability, given competing requirements for scarce resources.
Fast Rescue Craft
Photo: Department of Fisheries and Oceans
In 2008–2009, the Fleet utilized 95% of its vessel availability to provide client services. This is an increase over the 92% average for the past five years (see Graph 16). The remaining 5% of the time, vessels were mostly in lay-up or winterization, in scheduled maintenance, or undergoing refit. While Graph 16 shows the utilization of operational vessels, Graph 17 focuses on the amount of time all vessels were not available due to maintenance and refit. For 2008-2009, operational vessels spent a total of 5,689 days undergoing maintenance and refit. This is an increase of approximately 600 days since 2006-2007. This trend is expected to continue due to the advanced age if of our vessels and their requirements for extensive maintenance periods. In fact, CCG has dedicated significantly more resources and planned maintenance to its most at-risk vessels and will continue to do so to stabilize current availability levels.
The second relative measure of efficiency is multitasking – when a vessel performs two or more tasks simultaneously. Icebreakers, for example, can provide a number of other services while icebreaking. These include providing SAR coverage, performing observe, report, and record functions, supporting maritime security, and conducting environmental monitoring and response. Simultaneous missions can therefore often be conducted with one vessel, within the constraints of geography, time, availability, and capability.
In 2008–2009, 11.7% of days delivered were multitasked. While the Fleet’s ultimate goal for multitasking is 15%, we have had to revise this target due to the continued dedicated assignments of the CCGS Louis S. St-Laurent to UNCLOS and of the CCGS Amundsen to IPY research. These activities do not allow for multitasking. Table 11 gives a five-year trend of multitasking.
Significant investments in the Coast Guard over the past few years have enabled it to maintain its level of service to Canadians, and recent Government financial assistance has allowed the Fleet to make important asset re-investments. However, in regards to its year-over-year operating funds, the Fleet is becoming less able to respond to the same level as in previous years. As is the case with all organizations operating on a fixed budget, inflation impacts on our ability to meet client expectations, with fluctuating fuel costs as major consideration.
The establishment of the Fleet Operational Readiness Program within the Department’s Program Activity Architecture in 2007–2008 has more firmly stabilized the operating finances of the Fleet for 2008–2009. Without this stability and clear understanding of the amount of funds expended for operation, refit, and procurement, CCG would not have been able to present a strong business case to the federal government agencies that the Fleet was running low on funds for purchasing fuel due to unprecedented fuel price increases.
Of all the Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funds expended by the Fleet, fuel is the largest commodity purchased. Also, because of its volatility, fuel price is identified as one of the national financial risks accepted by the Fleet on behalf of all clients. The Fleet carefully monitors the consumption and price of fuel throughout the year to determine whether additional funds are required. Fuel represents a significant financial pressure for all CCG, especially when prices rise quickly, as was experienced during 2008–2009, which was one of the most volatile periods for fuel prices in recent history. Just a $0.01 increase in fuel per litre prices means a $630,000.00 increase in the Fleet’s fuel bill at the end of the year.
As indicated in Graph 18, throughout 2008–2009, the price of fuel consistently exceeded the budget. This increase represented a $20-million pressure for the Fleet, and in October, a fuel business case was presented to government central agencies to solicit additional funds from Treasury Board’s management reserve. Without this emergency funding, the Fleet would have been forced to suspend some operations to avoid exceeding the budget—a difficult proposition for any service delivery organization.
CCG Mamilossa, New Air Cushion Vehicle
Photo: :Benoît Filion, QC Region
To help manage fuel price volatility, the Fleet has developed the Fuel Management Policy, fuel forecasting tools, and a national fuel budget. These tools are now figuring more prominently in Fleet management planning and decision-making processes. CCG continues to work with Central Agencies to develop a long-term solution to fluctuating fuel prices.
This was the second year that the new Fleet Financial Plan structure was used. This plan and process allow for clarity of the expenditures related to the execution of the Fleet Operations Plan in each region and for each program. Many decisions had to be taken by the Fleet Executive and CCG Management Boards. Difficult choices are made and all were guided by the Fleet Financial Framework principles of openness, transparency, and accountability. The triad of the Fleet Operations Plan, the Fleet Financial Framework, and the resulting Fleet Financial Plan in support of operations, ensures that the Fleet manages and controls its expenditures both ashore and afloat as economically as possible. The Fleet operates 114 vessels and 22 helicopters throughout the country, including the management and support personnel ashore, with an expenditure of approximately $280 million per year. Table 12 indicates the Fleet National Budget in 2008–2009.
|Salaries||O&M||Fuel||Sub Total||Minor Capital||Total|
CCG MBB-105 helicopter
Photo: Cpl David Cribb, DND Combat Camera
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