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Whether supporting Canadian Coast Guard programs, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, other government departments or agencies, or protecting broader Canadian interests, the goal of the Fleet is to provide safe and secure, effective and efficient services.

While Section 4 examined services by client, Section 5 looks at the accountability and overall performance of the Fleet, with measures endorsed by the Fleet Executive Board (this board is the management and governance authority for the Fleet, consisting of the headquarters Fleet Directors; Regional Directors, Fleet Operational Services; and is led by the Director General, Fleet).

As new evaluation factors are developed, performance measures will evolve to ensure that Fleet has meaningful, timely and accurate information on which to base decisions and report to Canadians.

5.1 Accountability

Accountable to CCG Senior Management:

Coast Guard Fleet is managed through a clear national accountability structure based on the principles of openness, transparency, and national consistency. The Fleet Executive Board (FEB), a national body led by the Director General, Fleet, is accountable for promoting national consistency and leadership in the management of the fleet and its personnel in such matters as safety, security, operational and capital planning, financial management, performance and operation of CCG vessels and helicopters. FEB meets regularly to ensure effective overall management of the Fleet. The Regional Directors Operational Services, reporting to their respective regional Assistant Commissioners, to the Commissioner, are accountable for the day to day operations, program delivery and associated financial and operational management, safety, security, overall management and leadership of the Fleet and its personnel.

Accountable to Program Clients:

Fleet is accountable to its clients in the ongoing provision of services primarily through the execution and delivery of its Fleet Operational Plan. More generally, however, accountability for the overall management of the fleet is governed by Coast Guard's comprehensive three-year Business Plan - this includes accountability for the outcomes of special initiatives designed to deliver on the priorities of the Coast Guard in its efforts to enhance its services, support its people, and maximize its efficiency.

Accountable to Canadians and Business Plan commitments:

The following table reflects the outcomes of Fleet 2007-2008 commitments in the CCG 2007-2010 Business Plan. It reflects what has already been reported in the 2007-2008 Business Plan Year-End Report:

gbx.gifThe project or deliverables were completed as planned and/or decision/approval was obtained by April 30, 2008.

rbx.gifThe project or deliverables are substantially incomplete.

ybx.gif The project or deliverables were not completed as planned due to external factors/or substantial progress has been made but the project or deliverables were not fully completed by April 30, 2008.

Table 6: 2007-2008 Fleet Commitments
What was Achieved in 2007-2008
CCG Business Plan Priority: Support for Canada's Maritime Security Agenda
Deliver enhanced Marine Security Enforcement Team (MSET) training to relevant CCG employees.       Complete.
Enhanced Police Defensive Tactics and Law Enforcement Familiarization training, which included RCMP, delivered as planned.
CCG Business Plan Priority: Fleet Renewal
Develop new charging model and performance indicators for internal clients based on the concept of operational readiness  

To clearly demonstrate the full cost of having a Fleet capable of responding to Coast Guard needs and the maritime priorities of other government departments:

  • the Fleet Operational Readiness program has been developed and approved by the Treasury Board Secretariat.
  • a Fleet Financial Framework and national costing model has been introduced;
  • a Service Level Agreement (SLA) working group has been established with DFO clients on service commitments, performance indicators, and the new charging model; and
  • the timing of the finalization of the SLA will depend on obtaining full agreement of parties external to CCG.
Improve coding and business rules for the Fleet Activity Information System (FAIS) to meet Fleet and Client information requirements.   Complete.
Define requirements of Fleet Mission Readiness.   Complete.
Develop new Enhanced Fleet Planning Process integrated with Business Planning processes.   Complete.
Publish a Fleet Annual Report for 2006-2007 that clearly depicts quantitative and qualitative analysis of the Fleet's performance.   Complete.
To be published annually.
CCG Business Plan Priority: Focus on People
Seagoing Personnel Career Development Initiative - Build capacity and program.   Complete.
The initiative is designed and tested but there are indications that some classification issues may arise during implementation.
Obtain approval of standard regional organizations (SRO) and migration strategy from CCG Management Board (all DGs and ACs are accountable).  

The standard regional organizations (SRO) have been approved.

Principles have been developed to guide CCG's migration to the SRO over time.

Next steps are discussions with bargaining agents and communication with staff.

Develop National Model Work Descriptions (NMWDs) for technical and seagoing positions.   Seagoing NMWDs have been developed and submitted to classification.
Develop strategic frameworks for collective bargaining with Ships' Crews.   Complete.
Negotiations ongoing.

Fleet commitments for fiscal year 2008-2009 are reflected in the CCG 2008-2011 Business Plan at

5.2 Safe and Secure Delivery

The Canadian Coast Guard Fleet is an organization committed to safety, security and environmental protection in the delivery of quality services to its clients. The fleet operates in a significant risk-based maritime environment with our personnel, vessels, air cushion vehicles, helicopters and small boats conducting operations in some of the world's most remote locations under extreme environmental conditions.

CCGS Jackman, SAR Lifeboat with DND Helicopter.
CCGS Jackman, SAR Lifeboat with DND Helicopter.
Photo: HQ & NCC

The safety and security of our seagoing personnel, supernumeraries, support staff and scientists is paramount. Fleet manages these risks through its Safety and Security Management System (SSMS). Twenty-five fulltime staff are dedicated to work with seagoing and shore-based Fleet personnel to promote a culture that puts safety and security first on a daily basis. These employees work to ensure safe and secure delivery of Coast Guard programs through the promotion of a "safety culture" and a rigorous system of audits conducted on board all fleet vessels, monitoring the results of incidents, and developing mitigation policies and systems procedures to protect employees.

The number of audits conducted throughout the fleet has increased significantly since 2005, as vessels between 15 and 125 gross tonnes were introduced to the SSMS and vessels above 100 gross tonnes started to comply with the International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) Code. The initial introduction of these vessels resulted in a high number of audits in 2006-2007 as each of these vessels necessitated both a pre-certification audit as well as a certification audit.

Fleet Safety and Security tracks each reported shipboard incident. The number of reported incidents in the fleet increased in F/Y 2007- 2008. This increase can be attributed to the introduction of vessels between 15 and 125 gross tonnes. As with the initial introduction of the SSMS onboard vessels above 125 gross tonnes, increased awareness of seagoing personnel of the importance of reporting all incidents leads to an increase in the number of incidents reported and causes an apparent increase in the number of hazardous occurrences. The increase in unsatisfactory conditions can also be attributed to this increased awareness of reporting potential incidents for prevention purposes. Additionally, breakdowns, reflective of an ageing fleet are also included in this category.

Graph 8: Number of SSMS Audits from 2003-2004 to 2007-2008

Graph 9: Trend of Reported Incidents, 2004-2005 to 2007-2008 (# of Operational Days)

A number of initiatives are in progress across the country to reduce accidents and injuries to fleet personnel and better protect all employees. Some of these include:

  • A National respiratory protection program has been developed and is being implemented Fleet-wide in 2008. The program, based on the CSA standard, provides mechanisms to reduce exposure to contaminants through improved ventilation, enclosure or isolation, or by substituting a less hazardous process or material and providing personal protective respiratory gear when needed. All Fleet personnel will receive specialized protective equipment and will be trained in identifying situations where protective gear is required, how to use it safely, and how to care for and maintain this equipment.
  • Fleet Safety and Security has been working with DFO Occupational Safety and Health to increase awareness of proper lifting techniques to reduce the number of back related injuries to Fleet personnel.
  • A survey of the Safety and Security Management System aimed at all seagoing and shore-based employees has been prepared to encourage feedback about the Safety and Security Management system.
  • Fleet Safety and Security has been working closely with Integrated Technical Services to ensure that Fleet requirements are fulfilled in the Canadian Coast Guard Fall Protection Program.
  • The Fleet Tackle Guide is being updated to reflect regulatory changes as a result of the introduction of Canada Shipping Act, 2001, effective 2007.
  • A standard crewing profile has been developed for use on all fleet vessels to ensure safe and efficient delivery of all Coast Guard programs. Population of this crewing profile is expected to be completed in 2008.

Each of these initiatives is expected to have a positive impact on the safety and security of Fleet employees.

In light of Coast Guard's evolving role in law enforcement support, a new risk management methodology was developed for non-routine law enforcement boarding operations. The ship's Commanding Officer uses the newly developed procedures to assess the risk and formulate a mitigation strategy to reduce or avoid hazards.

5.3 Effective Delivery

Effectiveness is used to assess the extent to which an organization is meeting its expected results.

Fleet has developed various measures to assess its effectiveness, two of which are: service delivered compared to service planned, and operational delays.

L'Acadien II - a Tragedy

The Fleet uses icebreakers and helicopters to support and monitor the annual seal harvest off the east coast of Canada, as well as providing search and rescue services as required. This activity is risk based. Over March 28 and 29, 2008, L'Acadien II, a fishing vessel, broke down in ice. Unfortunately while under tow by the icebreaker CCGS Sir William Alexander, the vessel capsized and three of L'Acadien II crew were lost with a fourth missing and presumed lost. CCG has completed a major independent investigation under the leadership of retired Rear Admiral Roger Girouard. CCG also actively supported the investigation by the Transportation Safety Board and a separate investigation by the RCMP. CCG will develop and implement a comprehensive Action Plan to prevent similar incidents in the future. Interim measures are already in place.

By comparing the service delivered to what had been planned for 2007-2008, CCG gains an appreciation of the effectiveness of service delivery. Where values exceed 100%, service demands were actually higher than anticipated, and consequently more operational days were delivered than had been planned. Where values are less than 100%, fewer operational days were delivered than had been planned. The normal tolerance range is plus or minus 10%, given operational, environmental and program fluidity.

A Day in the Life of a Marine Engineer

Julia Murphy
Marine Engineer
Julia Murphy

After one year at Dalhousie University, Julia Murphy was uncertain about her future. That changed when she heard that the Canadian Coast Guard College was accepting applicants and she decided to apply to the engineering program. It was a perfect fit - she is now one of only a handful of women engineers in Canada with a First Class Marine Engineering Certificate of Competency.

Julia graduated with a Diploma in Marine Engineering and a Bachelor of Technology in Nautical Sciences. She spent six years working in Dartmouth in the Maritimes Region. Her first year was spent on the CCGS Provo Wallis, a small buoy tender. During her second year, she moved between the CCGS Edward Cornwallis and the CCGS Terry Fox, before settling for four years on the CCGS Sir William Alexander. In April 2008 she returned to the CCGS Cornwallis as Senior Engineer, and has since accepted an assignment at headquarters where she will be implementing a new maintenance management plan for ships across the country.

As a Senior Engineer on ships, Ms. Murphy's days started at 6 a.m. when she met with the watch engineer and the engineering staff to discuss and plan the day's events. As higher priorities arise, the engineers adapt their routines. As Murphy says, "There is the plan, and then there is what happens."

Ms. Murphy appreciates the fact that her job is never the same and is always challenging. As many vessel engineering systems are due for inspection every five years, she benefits from opportunities, as she states, "to work on something I've never seen torn apart before".Working with others to solve problems to ensure that the ship can continue with its program is truly rewarding to her.

Ms. Murphy is comfortable with the fact that, nine times out of 10, she is the only woman in the engine room. She says Coast Guard presents a great opportunity "the guys are always willing to help and that is who you learn from - far more than from text books - people are my best resource."

As illustrated in Graph 10, across all clients, a service delivery average of 99% was achieved although admittedly with substantive program variability. Services to Icebreaking, SAR, Science and OGD were all within the 10% tolerance range. Where the service was below or over the tolerance zone, reasons are explained in Section 4.

Graph 10: Service Delivered versus Planned by Fleet Clients 2007-2008

Another means of assessing fleet effectiveness is to measure operational delays, based on the time a vessel is available but experiences delays for reasons such as weather, waiting for equipment or personnel, equipment breakdown, administrative reasons, etc.

In 2007-2008, 820 days have been lost due to delays. The majority of delays were due to uncontrollable factors such as the weather, waiting for a favorable tide and difficult ice conditions (63%). Equipment breakdown accounted for 18% of delays and the remaining 19% were due to the late arrival of material, equipment and helicopter, and other reasons.

Graph 11: Reasons for Operational Delays, 2007-2008 (%)

Since 2003-2004, CCG equipment breakdowns have increased by 28.85% reflective of a continually ageing fleet (Graph 12). Significant single ship breakdowns, such as CCGS W.E. Ricker in 2005-2006, cause large annual variability in this statistic.

Graph 12: Delays Caused by CCG Equipment Breakdown, 2007-2008

5.4 Efficient Delivery

To measure Fleet efficiency, performance measures have been developed, two of which are: vessel availability and multitasking.

A vessel is available when it is ready to be assigned to a mission or client, and is unavailable when in winterization or lay-up, or in extended planned or unplanned maintenance. Vessels in winterization are essentially unavailable for use by clients due to the seasonal nature of the program; this does not mean that CCG Fleet is restricting client access to the vessel, but reflects fleet operations in a northern climate. Similarly, planned and unplanned maintenance is arranged in consultation with program client needs, and also serves to provide confidence to the client that vessels are maintained to the best of CCG's ability, given competing requirements for scarce resources.

Leading Seaman Marlène Charbonneau at work
Leading Seaman Marlène Charbonneau at work
Photo: S. Julien, Fisheries and Oceans Canada

Table 7: Operational State of Vessels, 2007-2008 (%)



Assigned to client Unassigned Planned Maintenance Sub-total Lay-up / Winterization Planned Maintenance Unplanned Maintenance Other Sub-total
67% 1% 0% 68% 19% 9% 3% 2% 32% 100%

Similar to last year, in 2007-2008, when available, vessels were predominantly assigned to clients (67%) and rarely unassigned (1%). When vessels were not available, they were most often in lay-up or winterization (19%), having scheduled maintenance (9%), or experiencing breakdowns/unplanned maintenance (3%). Even though vessels were unavailable more often than had been anticipated, the overall plan was effectively delivered to all programs and clients.

The second relative measure of efficiency is multitasking - when a vessel performs two or more tasks simultaneously. Icebreakers, for example, can provide a number of other services while icebreaking. These include SAR coverage, performing observe, report and record functions, supporting maritime security, or conducting pollution monitoring and/or response. Thus, with one vessel, within the limits of geography, time, availability, and capability, simultaneous missions can often be conducted.

In 2007-08, plans called for 7.2% of days to be spent multitasking; in fact, 12.3% of delivered days involved multitasking. This was in large part due to the impacts of the ice conditions encountered during the seal hunt when the operations of many vessels planned as single program platforms actually had to be redirected towards the escort of over 300 vessels off the northeast coast of Newfoundland.

The multitasking trend had been upward until 2006-2007, with a decrease in 2007- 2008. This can be attributed to the dedicated assignments of the CCGS Amundsen (to International Polar Year research) and of the CCGS Louis S. St-Laurent (to UNCLOS and IPY), which do not allow for multitasking, and to unplanned maintenance to the CCGS Limnos, which was replaced by the CCGS Griffon, reducing the time spent multitasking by both vessels.

Graph 13: Actual Multitasked, 2003-2004 to 2007-2008 (%)

5.5 Financial Resources

CCGS Provo Wallis, Medium Endurance Multitasked Vessel
CCGS Provo Wallis, Medium Endurance Multitasked Vessel
Photo: PA Region

Significant investments in Coast Guard over the past few years have enabled it to maintain service to Canadians and to make important asset re-investments. This will help CCG respond to increasing demands for its services, as more and more often the fleet is being tasked to respond to situations outside of planned programs. As is the case with all operational organizations, rising costs have had a significant impact on our ability to meet client expectations.

During fiscal year 2007-2008, the fleet consumed approximately 63 million litres of diesel fuel. This is reflective of increased programming in the Arctic (IPY and UNCLOS) and heavier than normal ice conditions. As a reference point, the Fleet had consumed, on average, approximately 57 million litres of diesel fuel annually, between 2003-2004 and 2006-2007. This increase over historical average, coupled with unprecedented fuel costs, created enormous financial pressures on Fleet in particular and on CCG as a whole. In 2007-2008 Fleet had planned an average cost per litre of 73¢ but actual cost averaged 83¢. This translated into greater than expected fuel expenditures for Fleet as well as restricting its ability to fuel up at year end due to budget constraints.

The effect of rising fuel costs...
An increase of $.01 per litre = $630,000 per year for the fleet

The basic concepts underlying CCG's financial planning are operational readiness and integrated planning, including a more accurate and refined National Fleet Costing Model.

CCG Fleet Operational Readiness (now a separate program within the CCG Program Activity Architecture approved by Treasury Board Secretariat) has enabled the CCG Fleet to evolve from a narrow, short-term planning approach driven by client needs and an allocation based funding model, to a more holistic and integrated planning methodology reflective of Coast Guard's position as the Government of Canada's civilian fleet that must be ready to respond in times of need. An entirely new Fleet Financial Framework and a new budgeting process were introduced in 2007-2008 with many processes radically changed:

  • The Fleet Financial Framework reflects the broader Government of Canada and CCG priorities, as well as those of Fleet clients. Transparency and relationships with clients are further improved by client service agreements, thereby ensuring that financial performance and program delivery are monitored and reported on a regular basis.
  • The Fleet Fuel Management Policy introduced fuel forecasting and tools, such as sophisticated fuel inventory monitoring reports, to help Fleet and CCG management make financial decisions related to fuel use.
  • Integrated planning means that clients at both the national and local levels are included in the Fleet planning process and are better able to plan their program results and budget more accurately for the services they receive. It also means that the maintenance needs of an ageing fleet are programmed in a more rigorous manner.

Table 8 shows the budgetary amount of operating dollars provided to CCG in the delivery of those programs that are included in Coast Guard's financial reference levels (which includes Science program and Fisheries and Aquaculture Management program budgets for vessel use), but does not include additional program support to some government departments which are funded under separate arrangements. (The table below does not include capital funds provided for the refit or replacement of Fleet assets).

Table 8: Fleet National Budget, 2007-2008 ($000s)
 SalariesO&MFuelSub TotalMinor CapitalTotal
Fleet 143,415 30,243 43,147 216,805 151 216,956




11,818 - 11,818
Sub Total 143,415 42,061 43,147 228,623 151 228,774
Shore 17,795 6,874   24,669 1,046 25,715
Total 161,210 48,935 43,147 253,292 1,197 254,489
1 Captured in O&M
2 Captured in O&M

Three SAR Lifeboats, Cape McKay, Cape Mudge and Cape Farewell
Three SAR Lifeboats, Cape McKay, Cape Mudge and Cape Farewell
Photo: PA Region